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New Developments in Federal Takings
Law
Eugene J. Morris*
I. Introduction
The United States Supreme Court has handed down, over
the decade from 1977 to 1987, seventeen cases1 dealing with
the interrelationship of police power regulation and a "taking"
under the fifth amendment.2 In analyzing these decisions and
the conflicting views of the justices expressed in their lengthy
majority, dissenting, and concurring opinions, there emerges a
thread which seems to have been consistently followed. That
thread is rooted in the fee simple ownership of real property.
It holds that when a challenged action exercised under the
guise of regulation actually constitutes the taking of one of
the elements of the bundle of rights making up the fee simple
ownership of the property, a per se taking occurs. This taking
requires the payment of just compensation for its
appropriation.
* Eugene J. Morris is counsel to Stolz & Stolz, New York City. He is an Articles
Editor for Probate and Property.
1. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); California Coastal Comm'n v.
Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987); FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245
(1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825
(1987); United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700 (1987); MacDonald, Sommer
& Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); San Diego Gas and Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450
U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Andrus v. Allard, 444
U.S. 51 (1979); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
1
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II. The United States Supreme Court Cases
In arriving at this fundamental doctrine, the Court has
distinguished between the accoutrements which flow from fee
simple ownership and the thing itself which is owned. This
distinction is illustrated in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhat-
tan CATV Corp.s In Loretto, the Court held that a statute,
authorizing the installation of a television cable wire on a
minuscule space of a landlord's building, allowed the state to
take a strand of the bundle of rights.' In so doing, the state
exceeded the police power authority to regulate. Thus, the
state had, in fact, taken part of the fee simple for which it was
required to pay just compensation under the fifth
amendment.
In Hodel v. Irving,5 Congress enacted legislation which
mandated that small shares of land left to Indians by intes-
tacy or devise would escheat back to the tribe.6 A unanimous
Court held that the escheat of a fragment of the total fee title
to the property was a per se taking.7 In both Kaiser Aetna v.
United States' and Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion,9 the Court held that there was, inter alia, some element
of a per se taking in the imposition of what amounted to an
implied easement of use by the public.
Moreover, in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles,"' the Court refused to decide
whether or not a per se taking had occurred. The Court de-
3. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Loretto illustrates the most extreme frontier of what con-
stitutes the taking of a stick from the .bundle.
4. Id. at 438.
5. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
6. Id. at 707. See also Indian Land Consolidated Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 459,
Title II, § 207, 96 Stat. 2515, 2519 (1983) (amended 1984).
7. Id. at 717.
8. 444 U.S. 164 (1979). The Kaiser Court held that the government's imposition
of a navigational servitude requiring public access to a pond was a taking where the
owner had reasonably relied on government's consent to connect the pond to naviga-
ble water. Id. at 180.
9. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). In Nollan, the Court found that the California Coastal
Commission did not advance a legitimate state purpose by imposing the condition
that a landowner grant the public an easement. Id. at 841.
10. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
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cided that if the California courts, on remand, did hold that
such a taking had occurred, then just compensation was re-
quired to be paid, even if the taking was only temporary."'
In contrast, in six cases ruled upon during the same ten
year period, the Court held that depriving an owner of one of
the accoutrements of ownership, without impairing the fee ti-
tle in any way, did not constitute a taking. For example, in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York," the
Court held that depriving an owner of the right to build an
addition to a designated landmark was not a per se taking,
particularly since the owner had the right to use the air rights
to build on adjoining parcels. s In Andrus v. Allard," the
Court held that barring the right to sell the legally-acquired
feathers of an endangered eagle species was not a taking, since
the ownership of the feathers was in no way infringed upon.' 5
In United States v. Cherokee Nation,"6 the Court held that
where land was taken pursuant to the federal navigational ser-
vitude, it did not constitute a taking because the government
always had that right and the exercise of it could not be
deemed a taking.17 In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association
v. DeBenedictis, s the Court held that barring the right to re-
move coal in certain subsurface areas, to avoid subsidence of
the surface land, did not impair the ownership of that right.' 9
The prohibition merely barred the right to remove a small
portion of the coal.20 In FCC v. Florida Power Corp.,2 the
Court held that the FCC's limitations on the rental of power
11. Id. at 321. The First English Court held that an interim ordinance prohibit-
ing any construction in an interim flood protection area effected a taking of all use of
the property. Any subsequent governmental action could not relieve the government
of its duty to provide compensation for the period the taking was effective. Id.
12. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
13. Id. at 137.
14. 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979). Andrus was not a real property case.
15. Id.
16. 480 U.S. 700 (1987).
17. Id. at 704.
18. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
19. Id. at 501.
20. Id.
21. 480 U.S. 245 (1987).
1990]
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transmission poles to cable television companies was a proper
exercise of the police power.22 In so doing, the Court was care-
ful to point out the difference between the cable wires in
Loretto, where the space involved was taken entirely, and the
pole rentals in Florida Power, where the utilities retained the
full ownership and the poles were merely regulated as to their
rental.23 In Pennell v. City of San Jose,24 the Court reaffirmed
the holding of many of the earlier federal and state court
cases which found that the regulation of rents charged for the
use of real property was a proper method of police power reg-
ulation and was not a per se taking.2 5
Thus, the basic thread in the skein of reasoning which is
fundamental to a resolution of land use issues is that, where
the purported regulation actually takes a portion of the bun-
dle of rights making up the ownership of the property, a per
se taking occurs for which just compensation must be paid.
But this basic foundation for the determination of the validity
of a land use regulation, although absolute in and of itself, is
by no means exclusive. This foundation is augmented by other
defects in the regulatory process such as illegal authorization
for the act, excessiveness, lack of a nexus which would serve a
legitimate police power purpose; and the multitude of other
bases available to support a finding that the purported regula-
tory act lacks due process.
Where the basic element of per se taking has not oc-
curred, the resolution of land use disputes becomes more com-
plex and less categoric. Thus, in the absence of a per se taking
where the alleged excessive regulation does not advance a le-
gitimate state interest (i.e. nexus), denies an owner economi-
cally viable use of the land, or significantly impairs "invest-
ment backed expectations," the courts have held that a taking
has occurred. A taking would not be found, of course, where
the regulation requires the removal of a nuisance because an
22. Id. at 254.
23. Id. at 251-52.
24. 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
25. Id. at 11-12.
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owner never has the right to maintain a nuisance.2 6
In this connection, it is instructive to analyze the deter-
minations of the California courts in First English and Nol-
lan, after the Supreme Court's 1987 rulings. In First English,
where the use of the property was impaired but there was no
physical intrusion or taking of part of the title to the prop-
erty, the California court held that there was no taking be-
cause the moratorium left the owner with some use.2 7 The
California court found that the property was still usable for
camping, hiking, and similar activities. Therefore, there was
no need for permanent construction and the bar to the con-
struction of any buildings did not in and of itself constitute a
taking.2 8 In addition, the California court held that there was
a strong public purpose in the effort of the locality to control
floods which justified the exercise of the police power to pro-
tect the health, welfare, and safety of the public.2" The court
also discussed the requirement for it to weigh the "public"
against the "private" interests involved and the "reciprocity
of advantage" elements involved in the case but did not base
its opinion upon these considerations.0
In California Coastal Commission v. Superior Court,3 1
the California court refused to recognize any inverse condem-
nation claims asserted under the Nollan doctrine on the
ground that since the claimant failed to file a timely writ of
mandate (within sixty days of the decision by the Commis-
sion), the issue of compensation was barred by res judicata.32
The California court further held that, by complying with the
condition imposed by the California Coastal Zone Commis-
sion, the owner had waived his right to recover damages at a
later date.33 The court based its decision upon the United
26. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (no taking was found where
a brickyard business was inconsistent with neighboring uses).
27. 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
28. Id. at 1367, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
29. Id. at 1370, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
30. Id. at 1371, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
31. 210 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1488, 258 Cal. Rptr. 567 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1989).
32. Id. at 1496-97, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
33. Id. at 1496, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
1990]
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States Supreme Court decision in Nollan, which was an-
nounced subsequent to compliance by the owner with the dic-
tates of the Commission.
34
III. Procedure for the Enforcement of Rights
These cases cast light upon the broad discretion available
to a court in its analysis of the basic question of whether or
not the action taken by the locality constitutes a per se taking
or a failure of due process requiring just compensation under
the Constitution. The adjective procedures available for en-
forcing the rights of aggrieved parties in this process are many
and varied and they depend, to a considerable degree, upon
the nature of the claimed deficiency in the regulatory process
employed.
Thus, where a per se violation can be established, the
remedy would appropriately lie in an action for damages in
inverse condemnation as well as in a claim for injunctive re-
lief. Where the taking is effectuated by statute, as in
Loretto,3 5 a facial attack upon the statute in an action for de-
claratory judgment could afford a proper remedy. Where,
however, the regulatory action does not rise to the level of a
per se taking, but is illegal or excessive and consequently is
lacking in due process, the most frequently used forms of ac-
tion would be declaratory judgment and injunction as well as
mandamus.
Another action was successfully pursued in the New York
courts in Kahmi v. Town of Yorktown." Kahmi was a suit for
money had and received by the municipality under a local or-
dinance which required the development of park land .or a
money equivalent for site approval of a residential develop-
ment. 7 In that case, the developer had paid the money exac-
tion under protest in order to proceed with the development
without delay and then sued for its recovery.38 The court held
34. Id. at 1501, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
35. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
36. 74 N.Y.2d 423, 547 N.E.2d 346, 548 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1989).
37. Id. at 427, 547 N.E.2d at 347, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
38. Id.
[Vol. 7
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss2/2
FEDERAL TAKINGS LAW
that the local ordinance under which the exaction was im-
posed lacked proper enabling authority from the state and
therefore was unenforceable.39 The court ordered the money
to be repaid to the developer. "
However, under modern practice, the remedy afforded by
the century old Civil Rights Act of 18711 (commonly referred
to as section 1983) is being recognized by practitioners in the
field as more suitable than the long established and well-set-
tled remedies referred to above. Under section 1983, the
plaintiff would be entitled to a remedy against an action taken
under color of state or local law which violates a person's fed-
eral or state constitutional rights. This procedure avoids the
troublesome "ripeness" or "exhaustion of administrative rem-
edies" problem encountered in Agins,"2 San Diego,43 William-
son County," and MacDonald' and has the advantage of per-
mitting a suit to be brought in either state or federal court. It
also allows the recovery of attorney fees along with monetary
damages, injunctive relief, and costs."6 In some instances, even
punitive damages may be awarded.' 7 In addition, the right to
sue under section 1983 has been upheld for violations of
"property" rights as well as "personal" rights.'8 A government-
al agency has been found to be a "person"'49 even though,
under the recent ruling in Will v. Michigan Department of
State Police, neither a state agency nor an employee acting in
an official capacity was considered a "person." 50 Nevertheless,
39. Id. at 429, 547 N.E.2d at 349, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
40. Id. at 427, 547 N.E.2d at 347, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 145. See also Albany Builders
Ass'n v. Town of Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372, 546 N.E.2d 920, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627
(1989) (decided at the same time as Kahmi).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
42. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
43. San Diego Gas and Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
44. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172 (1985).
45. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
46. Texas Teachers Ass'n v. Garland School Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989);
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989).
47. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
48. Lynch v. Household Fin. Co., 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
49. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
50. 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989).
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all local agencies making most land use decisions, and local
and state officials acting in their individual capacities are sub-
ject to section 1983 actions.
From the regulators' point of view, there is, of course, no
solace to be obtained from section 1983, but they are pro-
tected in a measure by the federal abstention doctrine. Under
this doctrine, the federal courts would ordinarily refrain from
taking jurisdiction on a purely local matter where a state
court could issue a definitive ruling to terminate the contro-
versy.5' All of these considerations, taken together, would
seem to indicate that the use of section 1983 should become
the favored remedy of the aggrieved landowner where land
use regulation is deemed to be excessive.
This is particularly so in view of the recent spate of cases
where the courts have sought to curb the increasing excesses
of local agencies seeking to accomplish ulterior purposes
through land use regulation. An interesting illustration of the
extent to which progress has been made in curbing abuses of
this nature is found in the decision in Seawall Associates v.
City of New York. 2 In that case, the New York Court of Ap-
peals declared facially invalid, as both a physical and regula-
tory taking, Local Law 9.5" The ordinance required New York
City owners of single room occupancy (SRO) buildings to rent
them under prescribed conditions and imposed substantial
monetary penalties for noncompliance." Although the attack
on the statute in Seawall was facial and resulted in an invali-
dation of the statute, it might have resulted in an assessment
of damages and attorney fees as well. This would have been
possible if the action had been pursued under section 1983,
where an owner is in a position to establish pecuniary dam-
ages as a result of the statute being improperly applied.
51. Ranchos Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir.
1976); Canton v. Spokane School Dist. No. 81, 498 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1974).
52. 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 544 N.Y.S.2d 542, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 500
(1989).
53. Id. at 106-07, 542 N.E.2d at 1065, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
54. Id. at 100, 542 N.E.2d at 1061, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 544.
[Vol. 7
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss2/2
FEDERAL TAKINGS LAW
IV. Measure of Damages
The intriguing issue which would then arise is what is the
proper measure of damages. In Williamson County, the
owner, a bank which had previously foreclosed on the devel-
oper, brought an action against the municipality on the
ground that a zoning change had reduced the number of units
which could be built on the site to such a degree that it be-
came economically infeasible to proceed. 5 The trial court al-
lowed the issue of damages to go to the jury, who awarded
several hundred thousand dollars for the period of the illegal
taking.5 6 However, the court granted judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict in favor of the Williamson County Regional
Planning Commission on the taking claim.57 The court of ap-
peals reversed and reinstated the jury verdict.58 The United
States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter on
"ripeness" grounds.5 9 Thus, the theory upon which the dam-
ages award was based amounted to a claim for loss of profits
during the period of the invalid restriction. 0
The usual measure of damages in a taking is the rental
value of the property based upon its highest and best use dur-'
ing the period of the illegal restraint."' However, because of
the fact that the governmental taking was involuntary on its
part, it might well be appropriate for the measure of damages
to consist of a computation of actual losses, i.e. lost profits
plus the carrying costs. The standard adopted by the trial
court for determining the extent of damages suffered in a tak-
ing case should be reflective of the usual law of damages ap-
plicable to involuntary takings, such as an award of damages
55. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 191 n.12 (1985).
56. Id. at 183.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 184.
59. Id. at 200.
60. See Trevaskis, Measure of Damages for Regulatory Takings, PROB. AND
PROP., Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 17.
61. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327
U.S. 372, reh'g denied, 327 U.S. 818 (1946).
1990]
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resulting from an improper act under the law of nuisance and
other types of torts.
One of the suggestions made with respect to the problem
of determining the amount of damages to be applied to invol-
untary taking situations has been to enact legislation which
specifically sets forth the appropriate measure of damages.
The legislative resolution of the problem would have the ad-
vantage of making clear to both the regulators and the regu-
lated what their exposure would be in the event of excessive
action on the part of the regulators. However, since the courts
have only recently gone as far as they have in holding actions
taken under the rubric of police power to be excessive, the
whole subject of damages or the payment of just compensa-
tion requires a new look.
V. Conclusion
It is interesting to speculate as to the impact the inter-
vention of the Supreme Court will have on actions involving
everyday land use decisions which affect neighborhoods in the
cities, towns, villages, and hamlets of the United States. These
land use decisions, exercised under the broad cloak of police
power and generated by local emotional resistance to develop-
ment and increases in taxes, are becoming more and more
chaotic and unbridled as time goes on. Now that there has
been judicial intervention at the highest federal levels, the
question is to what extent can they be contained and given a
more coherent direction in the future.
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